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Practicing Law on a Different Battlefield
Jacob Reimers*

"Apart from the graceful foresight of God the Almighty, the strength, wealth
and security of the Kingdom rest on the navy."
-Christian IV, King of Denmark 1588-1648
I. INTRODUCTION
I am pleased to have this chance to write about the function of legal adviser to
the Danish armed forces. I will focus on the navy, which is my branch, and on peace
support operations, which are the primary function of the modem Danish military.
The contents of this Article are my private views. I do not go into specific details,
because I aim to provide a broad impression of some aspects of the role of military
legal adviser in a time when conceptions of conflict are rapidly changing.
The position of legal adviser to the Danish Armed Forces is relatively new.
Created in 1997, the office consists of one legal adviser for the joint Staf, one for each
branch of the armed forces (army, navy, air force), and one for the Danish reaction
forces, five in all. We do not possess a large staff-or any staff for that matter-so our
responsibilities include legal research and the production of legal guidelines, as well as
day-to-day necessities, such as drawing up military contracts. There are, however,
dirty-seven reservist legal advisers who can be called upon to serve the entire military
in wartime. That number should satisfy the need to give proper counseling to military
commanders in times of heightened conflict.
The primary function of the legal adviser is to counsel force commanders in the
permissible use of force. Our recommendations are based on the various sources of
international humanitarian law, the mandate for the specific mission, and any
applicable domestic legislation. The latter requirement can be particularly
troublesome, because numerous countries' domestic law may apply when a
multinational force is assembled. These limitations are combined into a set of
regulations called the "Rules of Engagement:' These Rules spell out, in plain language,
*

LLM, Legal Adviser, HQ Admiral Danish Fleer, currently serving in the Nordic Polish

Barrlegroup, SFOR, in the North Pole Barracks in Doboj, Bosnia-Herzegoina. The vis
expressed are personal and do nor necessarily reflect those of the Danish government.

CbicagojournaofInternationa(Law

the rights and duties of the individual commander or soldier in various wartime
situations.
The need for these rules of engagement stems from the fact that modern
hostilities are most often low-intensity conflicts which require commanders to be able
to regulate his use of force according to the appropriate level of conflict intensity and,
especially, to the political situation. Previously, hostilities tended to take the form of
formal wars, where the rights and duties of the involved parties were laid out in the
various conventions and customs making up humanitarian law, such as the Geneva
Conventions and Protocols and the Hague Conventions. Most armed forces are still
organized and trained for this type of fighting. The process of restructuring the
military to address the need of modern conflicts is an enormous task, not made easier
by the constant demands of politicians.
An example of this predicament occurred during the Cold War. The Danish
navy had prepared to defend the Danish straits thereby blocking the Soviet fleet's exit
from the Baltic Sea. This kind of fighting could be prepared well in advance and to a
very high degree of detail. The enemy was well-known, and thus the battle plans had
been scrutinized well before any actual combat. The scene of the clash would be very
close to home, giving us such logistical advantages as alleviating any need to have an
immense support network available as the military had ready access to supplies. In
those days there was less need for a legal adviser close at hand because the scenarios
that we operated under did not include the complications inherent to modern military
operations within the political and legal limits of peacetime. At that time, all of the
military's extended authority was expected to be used in support of the operation. Any
legal issues were discussed at a very early stage, and changes in the scenario were
highly unlikely.
Today, the military is often employed far from Danish territory; Danish soil is
mostly unthreatened. Instead, the expected role for the navy is to be the backbone of
internationally ordered deployments around the world. This role requires a radically
changed view of military operations. As a result, a much finer balance has to be
achieved between peacetime restrictions and the need to fight effectively. This makes
the battlefield, or the mission, much more complex for the military commander.
This complexity is not so much the fault of the legal adviser, as that of the
political restraints put on the mission he must advise. Politicians are notoriously
reluctant to define conflict situations as exactly that, conflict; and thus their reticence
restrains military operations unnecessarily. In these situations, counseling the military
not only requires a firm knowledge of various legal disciplines and of world politics,
but also an ability to convince military commanders about the limitations imposed on
him by law. At the same time, the advisor must recognize the commander's military
needs and give him the necessary freedom to carry out an often thankless assignment.
In my experience, military personnel tend to focus primarily on getting the mission
accomplished, while legal advisers focus on ensuring that it is accomplished, but not at
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any cost. In other words, the advisor must ensure that military convenience does not
take the place of military necessity.
Today, military operations have come more directly into the public eye. This
public awareness brings with it some new demands and expectations. As a result, the
legitimacy of the military has changed radically-at least from a European point of
view. How can a legal adviser facilitate this development? Should he follow the
evolution from one step behind with the traditional caution of lawyers, or should he
participate in developing new ideas for solving ever-increasing demands?
II. MARrTIME PROBLEMS

I will start with a short story that describes the problems modem armies
confront in their deployments around the world. While returning from its mission in
Kosovo this summer, the Canadian military became an unwilling participant in a
contractual dispute. The situation arose because Canada did not possess the necessary
logistic resources to transport its armed forces to Europe. (Many countries have
recently faced the same difficulties. Even the United States encountered this problem
during its mobilization in the Persian Gulf prior to Desert Storm.) Because
transportation plans were based on the existence of a state of war, the military
assumed the ability of states to commandeer the necessary equipment. These powers
do not exist, however, without a formal declaration of war.
Canadians thus turned to the most natural solution-they chartered civilian
transport capacity. Unfortunately for the Canadian government, the contractor had to
engage a subcontractor in order to deliver capacity sufficient to filfill the contract.
During the transport itself, the contractor and the subcontractor got into a dispute
about payment.
In accord with usual business practice, the subcontractor threatened to keep the
ship anchored at sea until his demands were met. For the Canadian military, which
had 10 percent of its armored vehicles on board the ship, this was not a satisfactory
situation. Thus, the Canadian government dispatched two warships and authorized
an armed boarding to seize the transport ship and bring it to port.
Needless to say, there were not many kind words regarding the contractual
negotiations at the root of the problem, and there was a great deal of dismay within
the military regarding these events. After bringing the ship home, the Canadian
military was still left with the problem of ensuring that the situation did not recur in
future deployments.
As a result of this new world order, the Danish armed forces face similar
challenges in the near future. Hopefully the Canadian experience will guide us when
entering into contracts with private companies. Obviously, using methods bordering
on piracy does not facilitate contractual negotiations.
Military contracts differ from ordinary charter contracts because of the nature,
and necessity, of the cargo. In commercial matters, economic remedies for breach of
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contract are expected to suffice. As the Canadian example illustrates, economic
remedies may be insufficient for military cargo. The military simply must have timely
delivery of the materiel, since an entire combat operation depends upon it. The
Canadians were lucky that the incident happened on the return voyage. Unlike in
commercial contracts, where the stakes are "only" financial, the military deals with
matters of life and death. These high stakes set equivalently elevated requirements for
the contracting partner, and require a great degree of detail in the contract as well as
constant supervision of the transport.
Despite the fact that Denmark has several large shipping companies, and thus
has access to a large number of ships, transporting a single brigade-about five
thousand men and their equipment-will fill Danish capacity. Thus, transport
decisions carry momentous weight for the world's shipping markets. Other countries
deploy much larger units, and the overall effect on the world market is tremendous.
Unfortunately, politicians often overlook this issue when deciding to deploy a
peacekeeping operation.
The mere job of deployment, however, is nothing compared to the military's
constant need for daily resupply. This task demands a smooth flow of supplies over
very long distances, requiring more ships than the deployment itself. Some countries
have resolved this problem by attempting to construct special troop transports which
possess the necessary capacity and mobility to address modern conflicts around the
world. In doing so, maritime transport has proven very attractive because it is
relatively cheap and flexible-although not particularly fast. The downside to owning
the necessary maritime transport capacity is that it is expensive to acquire. Before
acquiring transport ships, a country must expect that they be used frequently enough
to make the cost outlay worthwhile. For small countries like Denmark, it is difficult to
foresee sufficiently frequent usage to justify such an immense investment. The limited
size of the Danish military puts a cap on the expenses that can be justified.
This is where I as the legal adviser come in. The legal adviser has a counselor's
hand in concluding charter contracts with civilian shipping companies. If this duty is
handled correctly, the military will have access to an extremely flexible system of
transportation at a very low cost. The mere question of resupply alone justifies this
operating procedure. For example, the Allied forces in post-conflict Kosovo daily
consume approximately 20,000 tons of supplies. Due to the location of the Balkans,
the only feasible way to deliver these supplies is by sea. A military capacity delivery of
this amount on a daily basis would require enormous outlays that would only be
sensible should the proprietary ships be in constant use in the future. But as the future
is unpredictable, the chartering approach offers the advantages of flexibility. A good
logistical plan, coupled with good contractual agreements, allows us to exploit the
existing shipping capacity of the world market.
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WAR AND PEACE

As I mentioned earlier, the classical conception of war is nor very relevant to the
modem international scene. Today, wars are mostly fought on a local scale, with the
surrounding countries formally at peace. This causes some confusion about which
rules apply, and all too often, military commanders get it wrong. This problem has
been observed with great frequency in the Balkans (I dare say anywhere where
peacekeepers are present). Even the lawyers often lack a full grasp of the countless
conventions, regulations, and resolutions that apply to a conflict. Because of this
confusion, as well as the military commander's frustration and desire to "get the job
done," situations are often handled "as we always do it" without regard to the legal
requirements.
For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") bombing
campaign in Kosovo in 1999 was not declared to be a "%ar" within the formal meaning
of that term. Nevertheless, certain human rights were suspended during the hostilities
out of necessity, and now NATO has been charged with violating the human rights of
some Serbians. This is paradoxical, as the campaign's primary purpose was to protect
human rights. Nevertheless, because of a formality, NATO has been accused of being
the violator of human rights. Thus, a formalistic view of this case ignores the fact that
an actual state of war existed-even if one was not declared-which allowed for
certain specific deviations from human rights conventions.
Sometimes a legal adviser has been seen as the warmonger, since actually
declaring a state of war is often the only way to trigger the protections of
humanitarian law. Ironically, escalation of a conflict is sometimes the best protection
for civilians, as there are few rules applicable to the gray area between "war" and
"military enforcement operations." International law still needs to be developed in
such a way that it can provide feasible guidelines for the hostilities that arise in
modem conflict and peacekeeping situations.
IV. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

As I describe above, modern conflicts are not the type of all-out conflicts that the
world prepared for during the Cold War or had experienced in the two World Wars.

Leaving aside the 1991 Gulf War, today's conflicts are most often internal struggles or
local wars. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a good example of this type of
mixed conflict with some of the military's new roles. The evolution of the various
peacekeeping mandates clearly showed that the world was not prepared for a
"Yugoslavian" style of conflict. The first peacekeepers in Yugoslavia-the United
Nations Protection Force ("UNPROFOR")-had an extremely limited set of rules of
engagement. This meant that they had little power to enforce their mandate, a role
which was well in line with the United Nation's traditional approach to peacekeeping.
Previous peacekeeping operations were almost always based on Chapter VI of the
UN Charter, which states that a peacekeeping force must respect the limits dictated
2ol
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by the parties to the conflict. UN tactics did not begin to change until the failures of
the mission in the former Yugoslavia became obvious. The United Nation's existing
Stabilization Force ("SFOR") mission has a different set of rules of engagement that
are decidedly more robust than the UNPROFOR rules. They are based on Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, which empowers SFOR to impose its will on the conflicting
parties.
From a legal point of view, it was evident that the basis for handling the conflicts
in the Balkans was not found in the standard laws of armed conflict. Even though the
situation was by Geneva Conventions all definitions to be regarded as an armed
conflict,' it was instead classified as a "local" conflict. Pursuant to UN resolutions and
agreements, the surrounding states sent peacekeeping troops. Because the
contributing states were formally at peace with the countries that they were policing, a
number of agreements had to be concluded with the "hosting' countries, such as
Bosnia and Croatia. Needless to say, those agreements could not be adequately
disseminated down through the system in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
That made it necessary for the peacekeepers, bound by UN resolutions, to engage the
local warlords, not so bound, in an uphill battle. UN forces had to maintain a
precarious balance between respecting the sovereignty of the host countries and
enforcing the peace treaties.
The problems that the United Nations faced were not simplified by the fact that
so many countries sent peacekeeping troops. To avoid complete organizational chaos,
various countries worked together in multinational units. Denmark's contribution to
SFOR, for instance, was part of a battle group which included Sweden, Finland,
Poland and the Baltic States. That alone could make the mouth water for any
professor of international private law. It is further complicated, however, by the facts
that our battle group is subordinate to the American division,2 and that because
SFOR is operating in Bosnian territory, it had to respect Bosnian law, which is itself
unclear in many relevant areas. Rules of engagement are drafted to set forth the legal
limits on the use of force. These limits take into account the constraints of
humanitarian law, relevant international law (such as human rights laws), the mandate
of the specific mission at hand, and the domestic legislation of the host nation. Even
after this laundry list of variables, the Rules must take into account the variations in
the domestic legislation of the contributing countries. For example, the concept of
self-defense is construed differently in various countries. Some states do not allow the
use of deadly force to protect objects, while some do not allow the use of deadly force
to help other people; but other countries take a very expansive view of self-defense.
1. Article Two of the Geneva Conventions states that "the present Convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." Geneva Conventions,
Art 2 (1949).
2. The American division includes the Russian and Turkish troop contingents.
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The Danish interpretation, for example, allows for the use of deadly force to save
mission personnel or equipment (regardless of the value'). The legal adviser is
therefore very important for the commander who wants to ensure that he exploits the
full potential ofhis troops, especially in multinational units.
Fortunately, not all peace support operations are about fighting. Most military
time is spent developing a peaceful society in the mission area. The military must be
prepared to play a flexible role in facilitating peace-building. In this effort, the legal
adviser is deeply involved with building contracts and other legal activities necessary to
nation-building. Most of these contracts, however, must be concluded according to
the domestic law of the mission area-law with which the foreign military and
corporate legal advisors are often not familiar. Because of the difficulties that
accompany our efforts to apply foreign law, we conclude most contracts in cash
payment upon delivery. While this very basic form of contract had the advantage of
being agreeable to most contracting parties, it requires some logistical planning to
ensure the correct amounts of money and supplies meet at the specified time and
place.
V. CONCLUSION

Practicing law during peace support operations requires a very down-to-earth
approach. The people that a military force polices do not understand all the intricacies
of legal procedure. The focus is on results, rather than exactness. This maxim holds
true for both the locals in the mission area, as well as the military personnel with
whom we work.
As military actions operate within a civilian society with more frequency, the
need for seamless integration between the two becomes more pressing. Although it is
easier for the military to operate when hostilities are sharply defined, escalating the
status of a conflict is often unacceptable for political reasons. By integrating specialist
advisers into the military force, we free the military commander to do what he does
best, while at the same time we ensure that he bases his decisions on an accurate legal

foundation.
Once the legal adviser clearly defines the military commander's scope and limits
of authority, the commander can carry out his mission within the boundaries of his
mandate while simultaneously securing the legitimacy of the operation. In the example
involving the bombing of Kosovo, the mandate was too narrow, due to the perceived
political ramifications of declaring war. In some ways, it is regrettable that politics
proceed in this manner. But the truth is that the rules regarding modem conflicts are
so profuse and varied that few people have a comprehensive grasp of them, while the
focus on breaches of the law in these conflicts has become quite intense.
The legal adviser has to be inventive in his approach to solving problems. To
make it possible for a multinational force to function requires working around the
many barriers and pitfalls of international and domestic legislation. Of course, being
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too inventive can bring a legal adviser on the wrong side of the law, and in this area of
work, a risky legal determination can have drastic effects. If the legal adviser is used to
his full advantage, however, a military can operate seamlessly alongside a civilian
society. By creating the necessary link between the different areas of law that regulate
modern military situations, the legal advisor ensures that society, both at home and in
the mission area, is disrupted as little as possible when resort to force is necessary.
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